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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOAHO 
GINA A POLEDNA, 
Cl'aima.nUAppellant, 
'I . 
THORNE R~SEARCH, INC. 
Emp!oyef'./Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LAB0R, 
Respondent 
Supreme Court No. 42220 
APPELLANTS RESPONSE BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho 
Gina A. Poledna 
c/o Mark 8 . Jones #4589 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 579 
Sandpoint. ID 8386-l 
THORNE RESEARCH, INC. 
P.O Box 25 
Dover, ID 83.825-0025 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
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RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT 
The CviT11T,1::.si011 has attempted to cnange the issues raised in the Po!edna's 
A I . '-h ~ n , rl . I' , h r'"· . . " c . • ' . 
, .ppea,, argu:ng ,, ,a, ro,e_na ,s appea.1ng oecause t, ,e vomm1ssion ... raneo to 
consider evidence she never offered or argued at the hearing before the Appeals 
Examiner."1 This is simply untrue, and an attempt to divert the attention of the Court 
from a Decision that is so obviously and fundamentally flawed that no competent finding 
or review can be made from it 
It was the Commission who issued a Decision so lacking in basic, fundamental 
information, that the Decision must be reversed or remanded. Poledna has only pointed 
out these defects in their brief. 
The issue is as simple as this: The Commission failed to identify and discuss the 
job Poledna performed (and any associated physical or manipulative demands of that 
job), then determined the "Claimant voluntarily quit a job without good cause connected 
with employment." 
How can you determine someone quit without statutorily defined "good cause" 
when you don't identify or discuss in the Decision what the person did, or the physical/ 
manipulative demands required to perform the job? 
How can a reviewing Court determine anything about the Decision issued by the 
Commission, without knowing this fundamental, basic piece of information? !sn't some 
basic, bare-boned identification of what job Poledna did at Thorne absolutely necessary 
in the Commissions analysis, so a reviewing Court can determine whether the Deciston 
was based on competent evidence and supported as a matter of law? 
The Commission is cleverly trying to flip the argument, implying that Poledna is 
trying to introduce new evidence (the job description/physical demands/manipulative 
demands of the job). The failure by the adjudicating party (Commission) to identify the 
physical and manipulative demands of the job in both the analysis and Decision is 
clear, fundamental error. !tis the error of the Commission, not !he Appellant. 
The adjudicating body, in this case the Commission, must have some basic. 
1 Respondent's Brief page 1 
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bare-bone basis to say, "You did not have good cause to quit your job." But it can't, 
uc:t,;au:se ii never identified what Po1edna did, or the physical demands of that job. 
Failure to obtain and discuss in the Decision even the most basic job description 
leaves the reviewing Court with no standard to judge the Appeal. 
The Court has limited jurisdiction in this matter as set out in Idaho Code 72-732 
and 72-733, et al. Pursuant to Idaho Code 72-732, the Court may only affirm or set 
aside the Decision and Order upon the following grounds: 
(1) The Commission's findings of fact are not based on substantial 
competent evidence; 
(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of :ts powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; 
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. 
Without some identification of the job performed and the physical/manipulative 
demands of that job, how can the Court determine if the Commission's findings of fact 
are based on substantial competent evidence, or whether the findings of fact as a 
matter of law support the order or award? 
The Commission doesn't dispute that Poledna has physical issues, and even 
cites to the evidence of record in their Brief. 2 
A basic, bare-boned description of the work performed by Poledna, and some 
basic discussion of the known physical problems, must at minimum, be made in the 
Decision. 
The Court therefore knows that Poiedna has manipulative limitations or 
complaints, as acknowledged by the Commission, so how can it now review this 
matter? 
With all due respect to the Commission, the Commission, lacking any other 
basis, "deemed" Poledna well enough to work. 
The other argument which the Commission seems to make, is that Poledna's 
physician never told her to quit her work, therefore, she did not have "good cause." 
"Good cause" is defined in the law and does not require a physician tell someone to 
2 Respondent's brief pages 2-3 
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quit. This is not what is required under the law. 
Tile idaho Adm1n1strat1ve Gode, under section 09.01 .30.450 defines ''good 
r::i, 150" \,\lhi:>n ::in emnin\/OO ,.., ,i+s ,,,,v·i,- Th•s se,.._ .. ,,... .... ---~,., .. es : ...... ,...~. 
_, __ - ••"-" -•• -.,,..nvyvv '-1\,,,,ltt VYVIJ\... 1111 \...,1.IUII ~lOl Ill fJOtl. 
01. Burden of Proof 
The claimant has the burden of proof to establish that he voluntarily left his 
employment with good cause in connection with the employment to be eligible 
for benefits. (3-19-99) 
02. Cause Connected with Employment 
To be connected with employment, a claimant's reason(s) for leaving the 
employment must arise from the working conditions, job tasks, or employment 
agreement If the claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from 
personal/non job-related matters, the reasons are not connected with the 
claimant's employment (3-19-99) 
03. Good Cause 
The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness 
as applied to the average man or woman. Whether good cause is present 
depends upon whether a reasonable person would consider the circumstances 
resulting in the claimant's unemployment to be real, substantial, and compelling. 
05. Quit Due to Health or Physical Condition 
A claimant whose unemployment is due to his health or physical condition which 
makes it impossible for him to continue to perform the duties of the job shall be 
deemed to have quit work with good cause connected with employment. 
The standard is a "reasonableness standard," and does not require the direction 
to quit work by Poledna's physician. It is a red herring argument 
To determine whether someone had "good cause" under the code, you have to 
balance what was physically wrong with the individual against the job demands. Again, 
we are missing that critical piece of evidence, so no determination can be made based 
in the evidence. 
The Court should also not forget that Poledna sought and was denied 
accommodation. Thorne knew Poledna had manipulative limitations which prevented 
her from continuing performance of her existing job. When Thorne refused to 
accommodate her medical condition, and refused to place her into other work, they 
effected a constructive firing. Thorne knew Poledna was unab,e to continue, and when 
they refused to accommodate; they knev: she could not continue at her present job. 
Thorne created an impossible ernpk,ymerit situation for Po!edna, and had to know this 
when it refused accommodation. Thorne got rid of Polenda by refusing accommodation. 
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Poledna had a documented medical condition, which the employer refused to 
e1cconirnodate. Thorne aiso refused to move her or change her job duties. Po!edna 
cou!d not continue performing the job at Thorne due to her n,an1pulatlve restrictions. 
She either had to continue performing this job, or quit. She had no other choice. Thorne 
was well aware that she had prior wrist issues and a prior worker compensation claim. 
The Commission was aware of this too. Poledna did the right thing seeking 
accommodation or a position change. When Thorne refused, she had no choice but to 
quit. Poledna had "good cause" as set out in IDAPA 09.01 .30.450.05. 
Poledna did not have a viable option available, having been refused 
accommodation by Thorne. 3 Poledna explored her options with Thorne and had none. 
Poledna therefore had "good cause" for leaving employment. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
We would respectfully ask the Court to reverse the Decision and Order entered 
in this matter and to award Unemployment Benefits to Poledna, subject her 
qualification. In the alternative, we would ask the Court to remand the matter for further 
processing. 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Counsel would ask for an award of any costs and attorney fees that may be 
awarded under Idaho L,3w, for the reasons set forth in this brief. 
t.--, l-, 
Dated this f 7 ·day of December 2014. 
/J 
// /~ 
/JU,. ~;~-
/ / / / 
Mark 8. Jones / 
Attorney for Claimant,:Appellant 
I 
J Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1,4-5, 175 P.3d 163, 166-167 
(2007), requires the employee explore other options than quitting. 
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